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The Precarious Sovereignty of Rights 
Hugo Adam Bedau 
I propose to argue that the typical theory of human 
rights (that is, a theory of moral rights whether or not 
they are identified and protected by law) is defective and 
misleading in an important way. Misleading, in that the 
rights these theories generate are far from the powerful 
moral swords and shields their advocates imply them to be; 
and defective, in that the theories fail to confront the 
chief sources of trouble for sustaining the sovereignty­
clairned or implied- of the rights advocated. Rights, in 
short, as I shall show, do not have the finality in human 
affairs often claimed for them. 
) 
-� } 
Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to take into account et1ery theory of 
rights; at most, I can hope to support my position by drawing attention to the views of 
several contemporary philosophers. I apologize for this parochial limitation, but even if 
enlarging the scope of my survey were to require revising my position, something will 
nevertheless have been learned about certain important features of our rights and of the 
theories about them. 
As we know, rights theories in political and ethical theory have been challenged by 
objections raised external to those theories. By "external objections" I mean the 
�riticisms from utilitarians, communitarians, pragmatists, and positivists that emerge 
from their own alternative theories. My criticisms, however, are internal to rights 
theories; that is, they are criticisms that emerge from reflecting on features and aims 
internal to any conceivable rights theory, features that a rights theory must incorporate. 
Finally, my aim is not to try to refute all or any rights theory, much less to pave the 
way for external criticisms. Elsewhere, I have shown considerable sympathy for various 
rights theories, and I am not about to withdraw that sympathy on this occasion. My 
purpose, instead, is to bring to light uncompleted projects on the agenda of any adequate 
theory of rights. 
II 
Three preliminary rcmarb. First, I take it that all the rights we have can be sorted, 
following Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 1 into claims or strict rights, powers, immunities, 
and privileges, or some combination or" cluster" of these four basic types. What Hohfeld 
found when he analyzed legal rights has also been found by philosophers to be equally true 
of our moral rights. The features of our rights that I shall discuss arise with regard to all 
of these kinds of rights, including claim rights. 
Second, I take it that the point of appealing to someone·'s rights is to constrain or 
permit someone's acts. In her book, The Realm of Rights, Judith Jarvis Thomson has 
pressed the insight that the practical point of a theory of rights is to tell right, holders and 
others what in certain circumstances they ought to do. 2 But, as she has co.rrectly stressed, 
there is in general no straight-forward inference to be drawn from premises about 
someone's rights to conclusions about what someone (either the right-holder or someone 
else) ought to do - much less what someone mu.st do. Having the right to do something, 
x, is not by itself even a reason (much less a good reason) for the right-holder to dox, even 
if it can be a good reason for someone else not to interfere with the right,holdees doing x. 
Thus, from the fact that I have a certain power, it does not follow that I ought to 
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exercise it (I have the power to renew your lease, but there could be many good reasons 
why I ought not to exercise that power). From the fact that I have a certain privilege, 
it does not follow that I ought to exercise it (I have the privilege of trying to organize a 
new political party, but it does not follow that I ought to try). From the fact that I have 
a certain immunity, it does not follow that I ought to invoke it {although immune from 
being required to give testimony under oath that m�ght implicate me in a crime, perhaps 
I ought to give such testimony nevertheless). And from the fact that I have a certain 
claim - right against you, it does not follow that you ought to, much less must, act in 
accord with your duty that my right entails. In every case of contemplated action on a 
right, we can see that other considerations of a wide variety are or may be relevant and 
even decisive as to whether the right-holder ought to act or demand action under that right. 
Third, the considerations internal to the theory of rights that I want to explore are 
quite familiar yet regularly neglected. They revolve around the conception of rights as 
absolute, as alienable, as waivable, and as forfeit.able. I take it that every theory of rights 
must have a position on these features, even if that position is largely implicit, as with 
the older "natural rights" theories. What I propose to show is that once we understand 
what theories of rights have to say about these features, we will see how far from sovereign 
are our rights in moral theory. 
III 
Let us  begin with the easy case, namely, waitJer of one's rights. I waive a right of mine 
whenever I have that right and choose not to exercise or act on it -perhaps waiting for 
another occasion or perhaps effectively relinquishing it altogether. Only the right­
holder is in a position to waive a right, and doing so is exercising a certain power. 
What reasons might I have for waiving one of my rights? There are selfish reasons, 
e.g., it might not suit my interests at the moment to exercise my power as your employer 
to abruptly terminate your employment. But there are also altruistic reasons, e.g., rather 
than mention the small unpaid debt you still owe me, I choose not to embanass you and 
decide to wait a bit longer in the hope that you remember the debt and pay up. And there 
are moral reasons, e.g., although I am eligible for re .. election as chairman of the board 
and am likely to be re-elected if I run, I choose not to, believing that it is better for the 
organization if no one person becomes entrenched in office. 
So waiver of rights shows that various kinds of worthy considerations can account for 
one's willingness to forego the �vantages that exercising one's right provide, in favor 
of advancing other values. 
Are there rights that the right-holder cannot waive, that is, rights that the right­
holder lacks the power to waive? Are there some rights that for whatever reason always 
must be acted on or invoked? What rights might these be? 'Hobbes's idea of our right 
of self .. preservation comes close to such a right, but his account is unconvincing and 
confused, as I shall show shortly in another context. Can't we all think of cases where 
someone might have a reason for waiving any of her claims, privileges, powers, or 
immunities? To be sure, extensive or frequent waiver of certain rights will prove to be 
incompatible with also holding certain jobs, positions, or offices. But this fails to show 
that the rights in q uestion cannot be waived; at best it shows that some rights won't be 
waived and ought not to be waived given other considerations - conditions having 
nothing to do with one's rights. 
No doubt a constitutional government respectin,g the rule oflaw may refuse to accept 
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a person's waiver of all immunity when confronted with criminal charges, perhaps 
because there is so little difference between the situation of such a person and that of one 
who has no rights to waive in the first place. Nevertheless, lacking a right and waiving 
that right are not the same thing; and there is something inescapably paternalistic about 
refusing to accept another's waiver of rights. 
However that issue is resolved, no rights theory can dismiss waiver of rights as a priori 
impossible. To the extent that waiver is recognized as permissible, even in some cases 
desirable, to that extent the right, holder gives pride of place to other considerations of 
value with greater force or weight than one's rights. 
IV 
Let us tum to alienation of rights. An inalienable right is any right that the right,holder 
lacks the power to transfer, give, or sell to another. Thus, an alienable right is like a 
waivable right, in that each involves a power of the right, holder. Jeremy Bentham, in his 
"Anarchical Fallacies," made a permanent contribution to the theory of rights by arguing 
against the idea that there are "imprescriptible" rights.3 My right to- is imprescriptible 
in Bentham's sense if and only if either no one can abridge or withhold (i.e., prescribe) 
it or no one ought to abridge or withhold it. Parallel interpretations apply to claims that 
rights are inalienable or unforfeitable. Do such claims mean that the rights in question 
can not, or ought not to be alienated or forfeited? For example, the preamble to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights implies that "all members of the human family" 
have "inalienable rights." Did the drafters and signers of this Declaration believe that 
we can not or that we ought not to alienate these rights? They did not say. (Nor did they 
sa.y whether any human rights are forf eitable, though we might think it appropriate for 
a political manifesto of rights to have addressed that very issue.) 
Hobbes in Leviathan, it will be recalled, insisted that our right of self,preservation was 
"inalienable,,,,. by which he seems to have meant some fusion of three distinguishable 
ideas: (a) no one ought to relinquish this right, (b) no one would relinquish it, and (c) no 
one could relinquish it - hum.an nature being what it is. None of these three ideas can 
be defended, (much less all three) for reasons that will become evident. Locke, in his 
Second_ Treatise, offered a different and clearer argument: Our right to life is inalienable 
because our lives have been given in trust to us by God, and so my right to my own life 
does not include the power to alienate it.s It isn't that I ought not to alienate this right, 
it's that I can't. However convincing to the converted such a theological foundation for 
my lack of power may be, it is unacceptable for any secular theory of rights. 
Recent libertarian theories of rights, such as Robert Nozick's,6 hold that control over 
the rights one possesses is entirely in the hands of the rights .. possessor. In that case, any 
right you or I possess can be sold, given, or otherwise transferred to another. On such 
a theory, there are no inalienable rights. Thomson seems to hold the same view7 but she 
doesn't dwell on the point. Whether in a given case one ought to alienate a right of hers 
obviously cannot be decided by reference to what rights one has or to the kind of right 
in question. It must be decided by reference to the gains and losses one can reasonably 
expect to accrue by virtue of alienating that right. 
I know of no rights theorist who would deny that we may alienate parts of our bodies, 
e.g., have the power to give away one of our two kidneys to a loved one who is on the brink 
of renal failure. Is there a rights theorist who wants to argue that I lack the power to give 
away my only kidney to a loved one dying of renal failure, when I know the gift will cost 
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me my life? Even if I am dying of an inoperable brain tumor and waiting for my death 
before harvesting the organ would guarantee the death of my loved one who needs the 
kidney now? Sacrifices of this sort might well be praised and admired, and therefore 
permitted. Todays bioethicists balk at the idea of a market in such bodily parts, and I 
agree. But it is not clear to me how opposition to the s�le of such parts could plausibly 
rest on the claim that no one has the power to alienate these parts -not even voluntarily 
and with fully informed consent. 
At least since Locke rights theorists have assumed we may alienate our liberty, at least 
to the extent that doing so is a necessary condition of becoming what Marx later called 
"wage slaves" -selling our labor in order to satisfy our basic needs, needs that cannot be 
satisfied in any better way. Nor has classic indentured servitude, voluntarily and 
knowingly embarked upon, been held to be impossible or immoral or improbable on the 
ground that it requires an illegitimate alienation ofliberty. On what ground, then, will 
one insist that complete alienation of one's life, liberty, or limb either cannot or would not 
or ought not to be done? Of course it can be done, even if circumstances are rare in which 
it would be reasonable to do so. So the inalienability of our rights reduces to the rather 
weak proposition that it is rarely to one's advantage to alienate certain basic rights. 
Even if a right were inalienable, of course, that would not tell anyone what he or she 
ought to do on account of that right. The inalienability of my right to do - imposes no 
constraint on your conduct; as a lack of my power, however, it does amount to a 
constraint on me. And such constraint as my inalienable right does impose on you is a 
result of its being a right. Thus, an inalienable right does not tell the right-holder what 
he or she ought to do. What it does, rather, is to some extent moot that issue because 
the inalienability of one's right is identical with a certain lack of power in the right-holder. 
v 
Now let us consider forfeiture of a right. I forfeit a right whenever I have that right but 
by virtue of some act or omission of mine that transgresses some rule, and without any 
regard to my desires or preferences, I lose that right in the sense that it is in effect taken 
away. Thus, whereas the inalienability and nonwaivability of rights involve a lack of 
power in the right-holder, forfeiture of a right involves a lack of immunity in the right­
holder: To forfeit a right is to change one's moral situation adversely. Unlike an alienated 
right, a forfeited right does not always or necessarily become the right of someone else; 
it simply evaporates. (I ignore any complications that arise from distinguishing between 
forfeiting one's right to x and forfeiting x itself.) 
The idea of the forfeiture of one's rights must be as old as the very idea of a right 
(although no hint of its antiquity is to be found in the valuable historical account 
provided by Richard Tuck in his Natural Rights Theories). 8 Locke, for one, certainly had 
the idea. He used it to explain how the death penalty (and by implication, any other kind 
of punishment) is legitimated. On the face of it, to punish someone by death in Locke's 
theory of rights ought to be a violation of that per:son's natural right to,.life. But Locke 
held otherwise, arguing that there are certain harmful acts that the innocent can suffer 
at the hands of others, such that those who are at "fault" for causing such a harm "forfeit" 
their lives just in case the punishment of death is what they "deserve.'t9 This amounts 
to saying that the moral offensiveness of not putting murderers to death outweighs 
whatever is morally desirable about letting murderers live in prison or in exile out of 
respect for their right to life or for any other moral value. 
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Forfeiture is a conspicuous case by means of which a theory of rights acknowledges 
that other moral considerations play a superior role in certain cases. Consider self­
defense. You are an unprovoked aggressor, and I cannot escape or persuade you out of 
your intentions to victimize me. But I can shoot to wound. I do, only I kill you. Did I 
violate any right of yours in doing so? Friends of forfeiture will argue that I did not; they 
will say that by your aggression in the circumstances you forfeited your right to bodily 
security. 
Consider another standard case involving the right to bodily security. Are we to 
believe that it is always a violation of someone's rights if he or she is tortured? (A right 
not to be tortured is a favorite candidate for an absolute right.) But suppose that a villain 
created a doomsday machine, set it to go off tomorrow, and we had no way to prevent 
its exploding except by getting the combination to the lock protecting the firing 
mechanism; but try as we might we cannot break the code. However, we have the villain 
in our power and we believe that he has memorized the code· and that if we torture him 
he is likely to divulge it. Would we think that his right to bodily security protected him 
from our use of coercion and harm to extract the code from him against his will -
especially if we also believed that it wouldn't take very much torture to get what we 
wanted, and if thereby we could save the whole planet from destruction? 
The doctrine of forfeiture gets much lip service but little analysis by its friends or its 
critics. It is notoriously neglected in modern theories of rights; you will look in vain for 
it (except for a casual mention here and there) in the recent trea�es on rights by Jack 
Donnelly, 1° Ronald Dworkin, 11 Richard Rathman, 12 Alan Gewirth, 13 Rex Martin, H 
Abraham Melden, 15 Diana Myers, 16 Robert Nozick, 17 Henry Shue, 18 Hillel Steiner, 19 
Larry Sumner,20 and Carl Wellman,21 to mention a dozen recent writers. I shall not 
speculate on the causes for such marked silence. 
But a rights theory must have a doctrine of forfeiture, or something equivalent, if the 
theory wants to accommodate or be linked with a theory of justified punishment. 
Locke's use of the idea of forfeiture makes that clear. For the kinds of things 
governments want to do to criminal offenders in the name of their deserved punishment 
-death, physical harm, incarceration, exile, fines, coercive community service, involuntary 
treatment - are clearly things that would amount to infringing or violating personal 
rights if private individuals were to do them. Thus, forfeiting one's rights smoothly paves 
the way for coercive punitive interventions. 
However, this role for forfeiture of rights does not by itself show that every personal 
right is forfeitable. Well, is it? I know of only one case where an unforfeitable right (that 
is, a right one cannot forfeit) has been defended. I refer to Herbert Morris's claim that 
all of us have a nonwaivable, nonforfeitable, nonreliquishable right-the right to one's 
status as a moral being, a right that is implied in one's being a possessor of any rights at 
all. ,.22 This echoes and restates in terms of rights theory a wise but neglected remark 
some years ago by Gregory Vlastos, when he was writing in a Kantian vein about the 
moral community. He observed: "The moral community is not a club from which 
members may be dropped for delinquency. Our morality does not provide for moral 
outcasts or half-castes. "23 
Elsewhere I have myself cited these passages in order to present the idea of an 
unforfeitable right. I hesitate to say that I have argued that we have such a right; but 
then it is doubtful whether either Vlastos or Morris argued for it, either. Perhaps one 
can argue that such a right is analytic of the idea of a certain kind of moral community 
because of the way such a right improves on all alternative conceptions. But I must leave 
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developing that argument for another occasion. 
Judith Thomson is the only philosopher of rights, so far as I know, who has given 
serious consideration to the idea of forfeiting one's rights. Her idea of forfeiture is rather 
broader than mine, for it embraces waiver; hence on her use of that term claims can be 
forfeited in more ways than they can on mine. On her view, there is also both faulty and 
faultless forfeiture; on my view, only faulty forfeiture. Like Locke, she introduces serious 
discussion of forfeiture in the context of rationalizing punishment. 24 Curiously, she ends 
her discussion by insisting that "The English word 'forfeit' is really too soft an affair to rest 
any grea� weight on";25 but this does not lead her to conclude that the theory of rights 
would be better off if it simply dismissed the idea of forfeiture. What it does lead her to 
do is back off from deciding whether some person E, in an elevator with another person 
D, has forfeited certain rights when E suffers a "temporary fit of insanity and goes for D's 
throat to kill him. "26 
Note that Thomson wants to say that morality allows D to kill E; the question she 
shuns answering is whether the circumstances warrant us in saying that E forfeited his 
claim-right against D not to be killed. What is also clear in this case, though Thomson 
doesn't discuss it, is that it is not E's rights that tell D what D ought to do or must do in 
this case. We can see that if we consider this argument: In the elevator, either E forfeits 
his right not to be harmed or E doesn't forfeit it. If E does not forfeit it, then D may kill 
E because of the stringency of D's right that E is violating. But ifE does forfeit this right, 
then D may, if he wishes, kill E without violating or infringing any right of E's. So in 
neither case does the status of E's rights tell D what D ought to do or must do. 
This seems to me to show in a dramatic way the insufficiency of rights theories, with 
or without a doctrine of forfeiture, to tell us what we ought to do in certain cases. If 
Thomson is correct, and any right we have can be forfeited, then the sovereignty of rights 
is in jeopardy, indeed. For once you have forfeited a given right, what now may or must 
or ought to be done to you by others as a consequence of that forfeiture will be decided 
by reference to moral considerations having little or even nothing to do with your (other 
remaining) rights (if any). 
VI 
Let us now tum to the idea of an absolute right. I take it that an absolute right is not 
one that the rightholder must exercise or act o�; that would tum a right into som:.ething 
like a duty. Rather, a right of mine is absolute if and only if there are no other moral 
considerations that can prevail against it determining your conduct toward me. My right 
is absolute, in other words, if and only if you must conduct yourself accordingly. Hence, 
knowing what my absolute rights are tells you what you must do (or not do) 1 and to that 
extent what you ought to do (or.not do), because there are no stronger or weightier moral 
reasons directing you to act otherwise. 
The idea of absolute rights has troubled philosophers for a long time. Perhaps 
Bentham was the first to worry about the following puzzle: If person A, has an equally 
absolute right to do x, whereas person B has an absolute right to do y, and A can do x if 
and only if B does not do y, how is the conflict to be resolved without appealing to 
something outside the theory of rights?27 Two or more absolute rights, it seems� are two 
or more too many. For this reason, philosophers sympathetic to the idea of absolute rights 
have argued that there can be but one absolute right. But how dowe know in advance 
that one person's absolute right to do x cannot conflict with another persons' absolute 
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Leaving these familiar puzzles to the side, philosophers have been eager to recognize 
a distinction between justifiably and unjustifiably violating someone's rights. But if any 
right of yours is ever justifiably ignored or not honored, then that right can not be 
absolute. Thomson illustrates the idea of a justifiably violated right (1 will follow her in 
calling this "infringing" a right28} as follows. Suppose the shortest route from an accident 
scene to the nearest hospital is across your private land, and I have to decide whether 
to take that route without your permission (or even in the face of your prohibition) or 
risk the death of persons severely injured in the accident. Surely, I ought to take the 
shortcut even though I have no right to do so. So your right to prohibit trespass is not 
absolute; circumstances may warrant infringing your right. What sort of circumstances? 
Exactly what you would think- urgent needs that cannot otherwise be met, or that can 
be met otherwise only at grave risk of harm to the innocent. 
Some philosophers (Alan Gewirth is one) believe that there are absolute rights, and 
that the need to protect them permits us to infringe the lesser rights of others. 29 But 
Thomson's trespass example casts doubt on this reasoning. Surely, if rights differ in their 
stringency or weight, then the right to life is more stringent or weighter than the right 
to property; and so we can certainly argue that the absolute right to life entitles us to 
infringe the lesser right of property. But in the trespass example it wasn't the right to life 
of the injured (nor the duty to aid the injured) that we appealed to; it was rather the inoral 
significance of the urgent lifethreatening need for hospital aid. What gave moral force 
to overriding or outweighing one person's property right was not some other person's 
absolute right. 
The idea that rights are absolute seems to be conveyed in the metaphor, popularized 
by Ronald Dworkin two decades ago, that our rights are "trumps. 1130 Just as in the game 
of Bridge a weak trump card can prevail over any card in the other suits, so it is implied 
that individual rights prevail over collective goals, the general welfare, or net social 
happiness. However, Dworkin's trumps metaphor need not be understood as implying 
that rights are absolute in my sense of that term; a right could prevail over a collective 
goal without being absolute, because some other moral consideration could be more 
important in a given case than this right. Similarly, when philosophers say that rights 
"constrain" the pursuit of goals, individual or collective, as Nozick does,31 this does not 
imply such a right is absolute; it implies only that rights have sufficient moral weight or 
strength relative to goals to channel the pursuit of those goals. 
Dworkin's trumps metaphor aside, it turns out that he really does think some rights 
are literally "absolute," but only in the sense that a political theory might so regard 
them. 32 Thus, a right absolute on one theory might not be treated as absolute on another 
theory. Nowhere does he mention any right that is absolute on all theories. Nowhere 
does he mention any particular right that is absolute on his theory. Indeed, on his theory, 
rights vary in their "weight", some outweigh all other considerations - hence they are 
relatively absolute rights - while others are easily outweighed. Typically, rights are 
neither so strong as to be absolute nor so weak as to be pushed around-easily by other 
moral considerations.33 
I conclude that neither Dworkin's trumps nor Nozick's constraints add any plausibility 
to the idea of absolute rights as I have defined them. 
The idea that rights are absolute but only relative to a given political theory is 
anticipated in John Rawls's Theory of ]usrice. His first principle of justice (the only 
principle that mentions any rights) reads: "Each person is to have an equal right to the 
7
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most extensive total system of  equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all. "34 On such a theory, it is the equal liberties that are basic; the right to these 
liberties is secondary. Although Rawls does not say so, these liberties, I suggest, are 
analogous to Hohfeldian legal privileges, and thus are a species of (weak) moral rights. 
Let us assume a political society that accepts such a first principle. Are there 
conditions under which this principle of equal rights may be suspended, say, in certain 
cases of national emergency? Are there conditions under which certain persons entitled 
to these equal basic liberties as of right nonetheless forfeit some or all of these liberties, 
say, by virtue of having been convicted of some crime? Are these or any of these basic 
liberties alienable or are all of them inalienable? Do these or any of these basic liberties 
have absolute priority over all other moral considerations? 
In a footnote Rawls remarks that "Although specific rights are not absolute, the 
system of equal liberties is absolute practically speaking under favorable conditions."35 
Assuming that Rawls means by "absolute" more or less what I mean by it, two features 
of his position deserve mention here. First, he insists on the absolute status of the system 
of equal basic liberties as a feature of what he calls "ideal theory" -that part of the theory 
of justice addressed to "the nature and aims of a perfectly just society. "36 But is there any 
reason to believe that these rights are also absolute under non-ideal theory, that part of 
the theory of justice concerning "what we are faced with in everyday life "?37 The passage 
quoted earlier from Rawls suggests the answer is No. 
Second, although we get some guidance in Rawls's theory for the role of rights in 
deciding how to design our political system, we get little or no guidance from those rights 
for what we ought to do in making personal decisions involving appeal to our rights or 
to the rights of others. Rawls may reply that his principles of justice are designed to cover 
only "the basic structure" of a political society, and so have little or no direct application 
to the casuistry of personal moral decision making. (This, it will be remembered, was the 
gist of his reply to some ofNozick's criticisms.) But that reply simply concedes the point 
under discussion: The theory offers no guidance at the very point where we need it. Rex 
Martin, in his book Rawls and Rights, goes somewhat beyond Rawls's position when he 
says "All incumbent basic rights in a constitutional system are absolute,"38 but I cannot 
see that he makes such a claim very plausible - and I leave open whether it is the best 
interpretation of Rawls's position on the point. 
If, as I believe but of course cannot claim to have proved here, that there are no 
absolute rights -political, moral, or legal -then we have one conclusive reason why we 
cannot argue from premises stating what someone has a right to do, to a conclusion about 
what others ought to do or must do. Only if rights were absolute would such inferences 
be legitimate. 
VII 
Virtually every theory of rights recognizes in one way or another that our rights derive 
their entire importance from the way they protect and advance the in�rests - desires, 
needs - we have as human beings. If we had no such interests there would be nothing 
for our rights to protect. (It is this feature of rights that encourages some theorists to 
extend rights to animals and other living things - animals have interests, whatever else 
they lack.) But a theory of rights is in peril if it allows conclusions about what someone's 
rights are to be derived straight-forwardly from what that persons's needs are. 
Thomson's famous plugged .. in violinist example reveals the faulty logic of such 
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inferences.39 Even though the violinist (owing to renal failure) needs life support and 
needs it now, even though the violinist has a very strong inrerest in continuing to live, and 
even though the violinist has a right to life, it does not follow that he has any right to your 
functioning kidney (which happens to be conveniently in the vicinity) even though 
without that kidney he will shortly die. His right to l ife is not absolute (i.e., does not 
prevail over the rights, interests, or needs of the person wh�e kidney is in question) ; his 
needs and interests do not give rise to any claim-right against you. Nevertheless his need 
(and not his rights) does tell the rest of us what we ought to do- or, if that is too strong 
in certain cases, other things being taken into account, it remains true that his needs do 
give others a reason for trying to help him. But this only shows that moral considerations 
external to the theory of rights must be relied on in cases such as this before anyone can 
cl.aim to know what he or she ought to do. 
VII  
It is instructive in this light to consider an important feature of Judith Thomson's 
theory of rights. On her account, what gives rise to our rights are "our inherently 
individual interests. "'4<> She does not use this phrase as a mantra, but she does not clarify 
it, either. I suggest that an interest is inherent just in case it does not arise only from some 
special or unusual circumstances in which I might find myself but you don't (e.g., as my 
right to ticket an illegally parked car arises from my status as a traffic officer- a status you 
lack) i I take it that the interest in question are individual because all genuine interests are 
the interests of individual persons; and I take it that an interest of someone's is not so 
much anything that he or she is interested in, but is something that is good for her or him 
either as a means to some end or for its own sake, whether or not he or she knows it or 
is interested in it. 
On Thomson's view our rights not only arise from our inherently individual interests; 
they protect those interests and our conduct seeking to satisfy them. We might express 
her view by modifying a famous epigram of Kant's: Interests without rights are defenseless, 
rights without interests are empty. The result is a theory of moral rights to life, liberty, 
and bodily security at the minimum. 
But now let us ask what is the difference, practically speaking, between a moral theory 
that regards our rights as derived from our inherently individual interests, and a -moral 
theory that ignores rights but attaches great importance to those inherently human 
interests and needs? Why is a theory of the former sort inherently (or consequentially) 
superior to a theory of the latter sort? Why, for example, teach respect for the rights of 
others when we could just as well - indeed, perhaps even better - teach respect for the 
interests and concern for the needs of others? 
We have seen that the rights one possesses do not always and invariably tell anybody 
what they ought to do,much less what they must do. We have also seen that on any theory 
of rights, what really matters is our interests and what we ought to do. Our rights are 
awkwardly sandwiched between these two and (to change the metaphor) cast only a 
feeble light on the connection between the two. So I end on what I hope is a provocative 
note: Why aren't our rights just a superfluous middle term between our interests, on the 
one side, and what we ought to do, on the other? 
Interesting and important a.s this question is, I cannot pursue it here because it would 
quickly tum into just that sort of external criticism of the theory of rights that I have 
foresworn raising. 
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